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1 Introduction 
Cotton has a long history in Benin’s development strategies and it continues to play a major1 
economic role today, accounting for about 50% of export revenue (excluding re-exports) and 
45% of tax revenue (excluding customs revenue).2 It contributes to the livelihoods of about 
one-third of the population3 and it constitutes 60% of physical capital in Benin’s industrial 
sector (19 ginning factories, four textile factories, and two agro-food factories for vegetable 
oil extraction) where it generates about 3,500 paid jobs (Ministère de l’Agriculture de 
l’Elevage et de la Pêche, 2008). In addition, cotton contributes to activities in the services 
sector (e.g. transport and construction), and also plays a socio-political4 role in rural 
development in Benin (see, e.g., Kpadé, 2011).  
Several indicators have been proposed to assess the economic performance of the cotton 
sectors in African countries (e.g Tschirley, 2009) but data limitation forces us to focus this 
analysis on three main indicators: production; yield; and acreage. In some cases, we discuss 
performance related to two additional indicators: the producer price of seed cotton; and 
Benin’s market share of cotton lint in the international market. We derive data on the first key 
three indicators from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Corporate Statistical 
Database (FAOSTAT), allowing to make a consistent comparative analysis with other 
countries over a long time period (1961-2017).5 Data from three other sources (the Institut 
National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique-INSAE, the Association 
Interprofessionnelle de Coton au Bénin-AIC, and the Programme Regional de Production 
Intégrée du Coton en Afrique-PR/PICA) are used to discuss the performance of the sector 
over the recent period (2016-2018).  
Figure 1 reports the performance of the cotton sector in Benin and in Burkina Faso, a 
neighbouring francophone country; it gives the production of seed cotton, yields, and 
cultivated area over the 1961–2017 period.6 The left panel presents the performance in 
Benin and Burkina Faso in levels, whereas the right panel displays the performance of Benin 
relative to Burkina Faso (1961=100). The data in the right panel show a relatively poor 
                                               
1 It is, however, difficult to understand the methodology underlying many indicators related to the importance of 
cotton in Benin. The values of some indicators are inconsistent across sources and important information needed 
for the analysis is sometimes simply not available. For instance, it was not possible to get information from the 
the website of the Association interprofessionnelle du coton au Bénin (AIC) (www.aicbenin.org) because the 
website has been down since 2018. Therefore, there is a need to develop a coherent framework for data and 
other historical documents related to the cotton sector. 
2 Before cotton, palm oil- promoted by King Ghézo (1818–1858) - played the leading role in Benin’s development. 
The relative roles of palm oil and cotton are displayed in Figure 11 in the appendix. In 1962, for instance, palm oil 
products accounted for around 60% of export revenue, against only 2% for cotton. From 1972, however, the 
share of palm oil decreased dramatically, to 19%, and in 2016 palm oil became almost non-existant in Benin’s 
official export statistics. By contrast, cotton’s share increased to 30% in 1972 and in 2016 it stood at 45% of 
export revenue.  
3 Benin’s total population is 10.7 million. 
4 For instance, cotton farmers finance local infrastructure and a number of them hold political power at the village 
and district levels.  
5 Another source for an international comparison is the International Cotton Association (ICA) but we currently do 
not have access to their database.  
6 Burkina Faso is a good comparator for Benin not only because the two countries share a common border but 
also because the initial performance of Burkina Faso (in 1961) was close to that of Benin. Production in Benin 
and Burkina Faso were 2,482 tonnes and 2,352, respectively. Yield figures were 1,204 and 1,026 hectogram per 
hectare, while land areas allocated to cotton were 20,608 and 22,925 hectares, respectively. Cote d’Ivoire and 
Mali are two other possible comparators but their initial production levels were much higher than that in Benin 
while their performance did not significantly improve over time (see Figure 12 in appendix).  
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performance in Benin’s production in 1962–1969, 1974–1992, and since the early 2000s. In 
1961–1969, this was primarily caused by a more rapid expansion of acreage in Burkina Faso 
since Benin was doing relatively well in terms of productivity per land unit. In the period 
1974–1992, Benin lagged behind both in terms of yields and acreage.  
In contrast, Benin outperformed Burkina Faso in 1970–1973 and 1993–1997. In the first 
subperiod, Benin’s performance was due to a spectacular improvement in yields, whereas in 
the second subperiod the result mostly stemmed from a more rapid extension in the area 
allocated to cotton. The left panel of Figure 1 shows that, up until 1993 and except for the 
subperiod 1970–1973, the output of cotton in Benin moved roughly hand in hand with the 
cultivated land area, suggesting that improvement in yields did not play a significant role. In 
Benin, yields thus appear to be volatile and, more worryingly, in recent years they have 
come down to the level where they were in the early 1970s. 
What are the causes of the performance in the cotton sector in Benin? This paper aims to 
provide a diagnostic of the cotton sector in Benin. In particular, it reviews the underlying 
factors of the sector’s performance, with an emphasis on the role played by institutional 
factors. Over the years the sector has operated under different modes of organisation, 
between public and private types, each of which has been reversed over time. We aim to 
elaborate on the underlying causes of these changes and their implications for the 
performance of the sector. For this purpose, we make use of academic and grey literature. 
Moreover, we obtained information from key informants within the sector. 
Section 2 introduces the framework of the analysis. Section 3 summarises the historical 
background. Section 4 reviews the performance of the cotton sector in the period 1961–
2016. It seems too early to provide an analysis of the sector after 2016, particularly because 
we lack crucial information on the current functioning of the Association Interprofessionnelle 
du Coton au Benin (AIC). We therefore do not provide an in-depth analysis on the 
performance of the recent period but we leave such an analysis for future research. Section 
5 presents the synthesis of the diagnostic.  
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Figure 1: Performance of the cotton sector in Benin and Burkina Faso 
  
 
Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT). Data over the 
period 2016-2017 is obtained from INSAE and AIC and is being updated in the FAOSTAT database. Note that 
the data presented here are sometimes different from the values presented in studies (e.g. Gergely, 2009, 
Kpadé, 2011, Saizonou, 2008, and Yerima, 2005) citing AIC.  
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2 Analytical framework 
2.1 Organisation of the cotton sector 
There are nine main interrelated functions in the cotton sector: 
1. input supply and distribution; 
2. research (seed variety development); 
3. technical and extension services; 
4. production – seed cotton; 
5. primary marketing; 
6. processing – cotton lint, cotton seed, oil, etc.; 
7. final marketing (of cotton lint, including export); 
8. quality control; and 
9. price-setting. 
In this setting the performance of the sector depends on both domestic and external factors 
(e.g. Bourdet, 2004; Ahohounkpanzon and Allou, 2010, and Baffes, 2002, 2004; Cabinet 
Afrique Décision Optimale, 2010; Gergery, 2009; Kpadé, 2011; Saizonou, 2008; Yérima, 
2005). We discuss the specific role of both of these sets of factors below.  
2.2 External factors 
External factors include international forces that cause fluctuations in the global cotton price. 
Figure 2 displays monthly data on world cotton prices in US dollars and CFA franc (CFA), 
together with the CFA franc/US dollar nominal exchange rate over the period 1980–2017. 
The figure also displays the real producer price, which we obtain by dividing the nominal 
price by the consumer price index (CPI). The co-movement between the nominal and real 
price series is strong (0.65). Therefore, the rest of the discussion will be focused on the 
nominal series.  
The data show that variations in both the nominal exchange rate7 and the dollar value of 
world cotton price have caused great fluctuations in the CFA franc value of the cotton price. 
In the second half of the 1980s, in 2001–2002, and in 2004–2009, for instance, the dollar 
value of cotton price exhibits a declining trend, amplified by a persistent appreciation of the 
CFA franc. We briefly discuss the causes of these fluctuations in the world dollar cotton 
prices. Thereafter, we elaborate on their impact on domestic cotton supply and the welfare of 
producers. 
Understanding the fluctuations in world cotton prices 
Fluctuations in the world dollar price of cotton are caused by both demand and supply forces 
(see, e.g., Janzen et al., 2018). The impact of world supply operates through the action of 
subsidies in some leading cotton-producing countries, the US in particular. For instance, 
                                               
7 Except for the 1994 devaluation in the CFA franc, the variations in the currency mainly reflect movement in the 
French franc (prior to 1999) and the euro (after 1999), to which the currency has been pegged.  
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FAO (2004) argues that world cotton prices would have been 10 to 15 percentage points 
higher in the absence of the subsidies to cotton producers in big producing countries. In 
value terms, the effect of subsidies amounts to a loss of about $150 million in the export 
earnings of West African cotton-producing countries (Tschirley et al., 2009). In 2003, a 
number of these African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) submitted a case to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to request the elimination of such subsidies by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and financial 
compensation. Following discussions at the WTO, the US removed around 15% of its 
subsidies to the cotton sector but did not provide any direct compensation.  
On the demand side, fluctuations in world cotton prices are explained by variations in global 
demand and by the development of substitutes in the form of synthetic fibres. Figure 3 
demonstrates that the role of synthetic fibres in the global market has considerably grown 
over the past decades. In particular, the share of cotton fibres in the world market of textile 
fibres shrank considerably from 70% to below 30% between 1960 and 2014, due to the 
marked decrease in the relative price of synthetic fibres. For Benin and other West African 
countries, this new factor calls into question the sustainability of any long-term development 
strategy grounded primarily in the cotton sector. However, in absolute terms there is no 
decline in cotton fibre. We come back to this issue in Section 5.  
Figure 2: World cotton price and the CFA franc/ US dollar exchange rate (1996=100) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) commodity database and IMF internal financial statistics. Note: Real 
price in CFA is obtained by normalising the nominal price by CPI. Due to missing data we were not able to 
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construct the real price before 1991M12. After the CFA/kg were constructed all series were transformed in 
indices worth 100 in base year 1996. The real price is obtained by dividing the nominal price by CPI. The real 
series starts from 1991M12 because of missing information on CPI prior to that date.  
Figure 3: Composition of global consumption of textile fibres and the ratio of 
synthetic to natural cotton prices 
 
 
Source: Krifa and Stevens (2016) for the left panel and Baffes (2004) for the right panel, which reports the ratio of 
synthetic to natural cotton prices.  
Figure 4: World and producer prices of cotton (CFA/Kg) and rolling correlation 
coefficients of the prices  
 
 
Sources: The original world price of cotton comes from the World Bank and has been converted into CFA with 
the exchange rate series obtained from World Development Indicators. The producer price series comes from 
Baffes (2007) prior to 1980, Kpadé (2011) from 1980 to 2009, and the Institut National de la Statistique et de 
l’Analyse Economique (INSAE) for the remaining period. The right panel contains rolling correlation coefficients of 
the two prices. The correlation coefficient value for 1980 is obtained using information from 1970 to 1979. The 
correlation coefficients for the cyclical components are based on de-trended series using the HP filter where the 
value of the smoothing parameter is set to 100. 
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Welfare impact of cotton price fluctuation 
Farmers are sensitive to the price of cotton, especially because cotton requires more labour 
effort and other inputs than other crops.8 A number of studies find a positive response of the 
supply of seed cotton to production price and a positive effect of higher prices on producers’ 
welfare in Benin (e.g. Ali et al., 2017; Minot and Daniels, 2002; Gergely, 2009; World Bank, 
2004; and Hugon and Mayeyenda, 2003). For instance, Ali et al. (2017) report price 
elasticities of cotton’s supply ranging from 1.3 to 2.6.9 In a related study, Minot and Daniels 
(2002) find that a 40% reduction in the producer price of cotton results in an 6–8% increase 
in rural poverty.10 Moreover, they estimate the multiplier effect of cotton: national income 
would be reduced by $2.96 for each $1 decrease in the income of cotton farmers.  
These microeconomic findings are in line with the aggregate data reported in Figures 2–4. 
First, the right panel of Figure 4 shows a strong co-movement between the world price and 
the producer price, although the strength of the correlation is less pronounced before 1992 
when the statistics are based on the cyclical component of the two prices. We elaborate later 
on, in Section 3, the producer price-setting rules. Second, following the drop in cotton prices 
observed during the years 2001–2009, both the output and the surface of land planted in 
cotton have declined significantly in Benin and Burkina Faso. However, Benin displayed a 
much larger negative response, suggesting that country-specific factors may also explain the 
behaviour of cotton supply.11 Conversely, cotton supply increased sharply in the same 
countries following a strong increase in the dollar price and the devaluation of the CFA franc 
in 1994.  
2.3 Domestic factors 
There are three main domestic factors affecting the performance of cotton: climatic risks, 
technical skills, and the quality of institutions. Climatic risks are exogenous and cannot be 
directly acted upon. Cotton supply depends on specific climatic conditions across the 
growing cycle: the length of the rainy season, dry spells, flooding periods, temperature, and 
solar radiation (e.g. Blanc et al., 2008). The role of climatic risks is not systematically 
discussed in the chapter. Technical skills depend on training and experience and will also 
not be discussed further here. But, the role of institutions is of special interest to us. These 
include the type of coordination of the different functions in the supply chain and the specific 
rules and regulations that are involved. 
There are two views regarding the required type of coordination in the cotton value chain: 
the French view and the World Bank view. The French view is based on the strategy 
developed by the Compagnie francaise pour le developpement des fibres textiles (CFDT), a 
                                               
8 For instance, Minot and Daniels (2002) report that cotton is 15% more labour-intensive than the area-weighted 
average of other crops analysed in their study on Benin (maize and cassava, cowpeas, groundnuts, sorghum, 
millet, yams). Moreover, the cultivation of cotton requires 23% more hired labour per hectare than the average of 
other crops 
9 Moreover, the authors estimate the cross-price supply elasticity related to alternative crops to cotton (maize, 
millet, sorghum and related crops, rice, yam, cassava and other tubers, beans and related crops, and peanuts 
and related crops) in the range -0.28 to -0.39%.  
10 The baseline poverty incidence is estimated at 40%.  
11 During the years 1984–1993, the continuous appreciation of the CFA also contributed to low cotton prices, yet 
this did not prevent cotton supply from rising perceptibly, not only in Benin but also in Burkina Faso. This again 
suggests that other factors than producer prices have been at work. 
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French parastatal company that modernised the cotton sector in the former French colonies 
of Africa. It advocates a vertical integration of the value chain through a single channel (a 
monopoly/monopsony) from farmers to ginnery companies and input suppliers. Moreover, 
the chain controls research activities for variety development, which are linked to extension 
services. In addition, it is in charge of promoting stable producer prices. After independence, 
the CFDT entered into joint ventures with African governments and the single channel was 
maintained. In the mid-1980s, when world cotton prices collapsed, subsidies from 
governments and money from donors were used to rescue the African cotton companies.  
The World Bank view assumes that (state) monopoly is less efficient because of excessive 
public employment and political interference (e.g. Baffes, 2007). Such a monopoly can also 
be blamed for excessively taxing farmers who receive a rather small share of the world 
cotton price. Hence, allowing competition should decrease this tax and stimulate the supply 
of cotton. The view of the World Bank, also supported by the IMF, was dominant in the 
1980s and was enforced through the structural adjustment programmes in many African 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Conceptually, it is hard to say a priori which of the two modes of coordination would 
generate a better performance for the cotton sector, because each of the approaches has its 
advantages and disadvantages. For instance, while competition can boost producer prices, it 
typically implies higher coordination cost in a weak institutional environment characterised by 
imperfect credit markets, asymmetric information, and weak contract enforcement. In a 
system where ginneries provide input credit to farmers, competition will encourage side-
selling12 to cotton-buying competitors, discouraging credit supply by final buyers, thus 
causing inefficiencies in the input segment of the supply chain. By contrast, whereas a 
monopoly maintains a lower producer price it will achieve a higher degree of coordination 
and better limit the side-selling problem. Hence, it is shown that the organisation of the value 
chain implies a trade-off between competition and coordination (e.g. Tschirley et al., 2004, 
2009, and 2010). A recent empirical analysis by Delpeuch and Leblois (2014) confirms this 
trade-off. They find that African cotton producers in a competitive system achieve higher 
yields but lower acreage and production, whereas in a regulated system of the CFDT type 
lower yields but higher acreage and production are observed. On a related point, Baffes 
(2007) argues that taxation of farmers has been reduced as a result of the liberalisation and 
privatisation of the cotton sector in Benin and many other African countries13, as evidenced 
in Table 114 below.15 Figure 4 above also shows that the world price of cotton is much higher 
than the producer price but we currently lack relevant and consistent information to discuss 
the underlying factors behind the difference.  
                                               
12 “Side-selling is the sale of seed cotton to a buyer other than the company that provided the producer with 
inputs on credit during the production season”.(Poulton et al, 2004) 
13 However, Benin represents a special case as regards the timing and the nature of these liberalisation 
programmes, as we will discuss in the rest of the chapter.  
14 Note, however, that many other factors may be driving these nominal rate of assistance numbers and we do 
not have the necessary material to discuss this further. The data on producer prices and subsidies are also very 
noisy. 
15 The idea of taxation of African farmers goes back to Bates (1981)  
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Table 1: Nominal rate of assistance16 to cotton farmers in West and Central African 
countries (%) 
 
Sources: Baffes (2007) 
Finally, there is also a debate about the mode of coordination among producers. For 
instance, should access to technical and agricultural services be organised at the individual 
or the farmer-group levels? Should production and input decisions be taken at the individual 
or the famer group level? Related to access to input and credit, a joint liability approach is 
used in the cotton sector of Benin and other West African countries. The joint liability 
approach may create, however, free riding problems, which will generate inefficiencies in a 
weak contract enforcement environment. Farmers often report this free riding problem in 
West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali) as evidenced by Theriault and Serra 
(2014). Theoretically, however, it is difficult to predict the efficiency of the farmers who report 
the problem. For instance, inefficient farmers may report more the problem if they are afraid 
that their relatively low level of production will not make it enough to cover credit at the 
reimbursement time. In this case, their assets may have to be seized in order to repay the 
loan. In the same way, efficient farmers may also report the free riding problem because 
they have to pay for those who fail to repay their loans. Theriault and Serra (2014) argue that 
producers who report more problems with the joint liability feature are more inefficient in a 
sample of West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali). 
 
 
                                               
16 The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is based on the difference between the net price received by producers 
and world prices, controlling for freight and ginnery costs. A negative value indicates taxation whereas a positive 
value reflects subsidies to farmers. The author includes price subsidies but it is not clear how input subsidies and 
the price of credit have been taken into account in the estimation.  
Regulation of a Dominant Sector: A Case Study of Cotton 
© Economic Development & Institutions  10 
3 Historical background of cotton in Benin: 1641-1960 
3.1 Pre-colonial period to 1949: private mode of organisation 
The origin of cotton in Benin dates back to the pre-colonial period. Cotton was produced in 
the northern (Atacora-Donga and Alibori-Borgou departments) and central (Zou-Collines 
departments) regions of the country, and the raw cotton was entirely processed by the local 
artisanal textile sector (Manning 1980, 1982; and D’Almeida-Topor, 1992).17 Figure 5 shows 
that the Alibori-Borgou departments easily dominated cotton production. Moreover, the data 
show that the central region, which was the second most important contributor to cotton 
production in the 1970s and 1980s, has declined considerably over time. In fact, the level of 
cotton production (not reported) has increased in the northern region, while it has decreased 
in the central region.  
The northern region has a dry climate whereas the central has a humid climate. A humid 
climate is less favourable to cotton production and this partly explains the decline in cotton 
production in the central region (e.g. Ton, 2004). In particular, the producer cost of cotton is 
relatively high in that region, for example because farmers would need to consume relatively 
more pesticide to protect cotton from diseases. As a result, farmers switch more frequently 
to alternative crops when the relative producer price of cotton decreases (and/or the relative 
cost of cotton increases, or when the quality of input deteriorates). On the other hand, the 
support of development aid projects is one possible explanation for the increase in the 
production in the northern region.18 We will elaborate on these points later. 
Figure 5: Share of the main cotton-producing areas (percentage) 
  
                                               
17 Before 1999 Benin was divided into six departments: Atacora, Atlantique, Borgou, Mono, Ouémé, and Zou. In 
the 1999 reform each of these six department were divided into two departments, such that the country now 
includes 12 departments, as displayed in the right panel of Figure 5: Atacora has been split into Atacora and 
Donga; Atlantique into Atlantique and Litoral; Borgou into Borgou and Alibori; Mono into Mono and Couffo; 
Ouémé into Ouémé and Platteau; and Zou into Zou and Collines. Because of these changes it is difficult to trace 
the production of specific departments before 1999. Thus, when we refer to information related to Borgou 
department (before 1999) in the text we have in mind that this information also includes the Alibori department. 
18 There was also a project in the central region but it seems that more efforts were put into developing the 
northern region. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s there were more projects for cotton development in the 
northern area.  
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Sources: Kpadé (2011) and World Bank (1984). The map in the right panel displays the production shares for 
2016 
During the colonial period (1894–1959), French entrepreneurs encouraged the production of 
cotton with the purpose of supplying cotton to their textile industries in France.19 They 
developed two main strategies, which seem to be still relevant today (Manning, 1982; and 
Kpadé and Boinon, 2011): i) introduction of new varieties of the Barbadense family of cotton 
to improve productivity; and ii) promotion of small-sized farming (in order to limit labour 
movement).20 In this context, ginneries were built in the central area (in Savalou and 
Bohicon) in order to process raw cotton.21  
The market structure of the cotton industry in this period was thus decentralised and 
potentially competitive with the private sector in charge of the main activities, including 
marketing and processing. Following these efforts cotton production improved and exports to 
France began around 190422 (Maning, 1982). The two ginneries were upgraded in 1924 
(Savalou) and 1924 (Bohicon). However, the sector’s development was still marginal around 
192623 (Figure 5). One problem was the low producer price compared to other crops (coffee, 
cacao) that were subsidised by the colonial authorities. Moreover, due to several market 
imperfections that characterise Africa’s rural areas, the market-based mode of coordination 
did not ensure an efficient provision of inputs and agri-services to farmers (Kpadé and 
Boinon, 2011).  
                                               
19 Cotton was also encouraged in other former French colonies at that time. French entrepreneurs were 
motivated to do this because of difficulties in importing cotton from the USA (Fok, 1993; and Kpadé and Boinon, 
2011). For this purpose, they created the Association Cotonière Coloniale (ACC) which had a representative in 
each of the colonies. Emile Poisson was the representative for Benin at that time (Manning 1980, 1982; and 
D’Almeida-Topor, 1992).  
20 In addition, farmers were coerced to produce cotton with the help of the colonial administration. 
21 The construction of the first ginneries in the central region can be explained by the relative proximity of that 
region to the Port of Cotonou, through which cotton lint is exported to France. The fact that the colonial power 
settled first in the central region before the northern region could also be an additional reason.  
22 1904 coincided with the period when Benin became a member of the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), the 
federation of the eight French colonial territories in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, and Togo). 
23 The Great Depression (1929) and the Second World War (1939–1945) also caused volatility in exports. 
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Figure 6: Cotton exports in 1903–1960 (tonnes) 
 
Sources: Author’s estimation based on Manning (1982) and Kpadé (2011).  
The original data obtained from the two sources did not coincide in several periods.  
The data reported here are a simple average of figures from both sources. Data is missing 
in 1942-1944 due to the second world war event. 
3.2 1949–1960: private mode of organisation but regulated by the 
French government 
The modern development of the cotton industry came after the CFDT24 was created in 1949 
to take over the management of the cotton industry in the colonial territories. A research 
body, the Institut de recherche du coton et des textiles exotiques (IRCT), was established 
with the aim of developing higher yield varieties of seed cotton in support of CFDT activities. 
These changes occurred in the context of a new strategy initiated by France to develop its 
colonies after the Brazzaville conference. The strategy was based on development plans 
which were designed for each territory and financed by a French organisation, Fonds 
d'investissement pour le développement économique et social (FIDES). In Benin, FIDES 
financed two development plans in 1946–1952 and 1953–1960 (Manning, 1982; and 
Sotindjo, 2016).25  
In terms of organisation of the cotton industry, the CFDT promoted a single chain running 
from farming to exporting activities. In particular, the CFDT wielded monopsony power for 
the purchase of seed cotton from farmers and monopoly power for the supply of inputs, 
primary processing of seed cotton, and marketing of cotton lint. Typically, farmers would 
obtain inputs on credit before sowing, and they would pay this back in the form of seed 
                                               
24 In 2001 the CFDT became Développement des Agro-Industries du Sud (DAGRIS). 
25 The plans supported the development of agriculture, industry, infrastructure, and other public services. In 
agriculture, palm oil was promoted as well. 
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cotton after production was realised. The CFDT also supported the acquisition of equipment 
by farmers and it provided them with technical and extension services. In addition, it 
encouraged the production of high-quality seed cotton by offering a price premium. The 
producer prices were set on a pan-territorial basis and announced before the sowing 
season. The CFDT bought the whole harvest from the producers at the announced price. In 
order to process the growing production, two new ginnery factories were built in 1955 in 
Borgou (in Kandi) and in Atacora (Djougou).26 Exports also improved, as can been seen 
from Figure 5.  
                                               
26 In September 1955 a stabilisation fund the Caisse de stabilisation des priz du coton de la fédération de l’AOF 
(CSPC) was created to jointly manage the producer price in the francophone cotton-producing colonies in West 
Africa. CSPC set the producer price and was managed by the general government of AOF, based in Dakar. It 
was financed from cotton revenue but also from subsidies received from the french textile marketing board (Fond 
de Soutien des Textile). When AOF ceased to exist in 1958, CSPC was replaced in September 1959 by a new 
regional stabilisation fund (the Caisse de Stabilization Inter-Etats du Coton), which from then on was jointly 
managed by the West African francophone countries. We currently lack additional details on these funds. 
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4 Understanding the performance of the cotton sector 
in Benin: 1961–2016 
4.1 1961–1970: a private mode of organisation but regulated by 
the newly independent state 
This period immediately following independence (in 1960) was characterised by political 
instability.27 In line with the economic policy of the previous period, two development plans 
were implemented, covering the periods 1961–1965 and 1966–1970. These plans were 
largely financed by the French government through its development fund Fonds d’Aide à la 
Coopération (FAC), which replaced FIDES in 1959. The European Commission’s special 
fund for development, Fonds Européen de Développement (FED), also contributed to the 
financing of the development plans in Benin. 
After independence, many rules and decisions were enacted to organise the agriculture 
sector.28 As the political context was characterised by a growing nationalist movement that 
had started during the colonial period, the new government started to promote parastatal 
companies and national players in various activities of the economy. For instance, a 
registration card was introduced to regulate the primary marketing of seed cotton.29 In the 
same way, there was a rule limiting exports of raw cotton, so that it could be processed 
inside the country.30 A national stabilisation fund, the Fonds de soutien des produits à 
l’exportation (FS)31 was established in 1961 to protect agriculture exports when world prices 
became lower than the operating costs (producer price, processing costs, and transportation 
cost). FS was financed by export revenue and subsidies. Taxes were charged on all export 
products.32  
The IRCT introduced a new high-yielding variety of cotton (Hirsutum) to replace the existing 
one (Barbadense). This was done in the northern region in 1962 and later, in 1965, in the 
central region (World Bank, 1972). While the two varieties were still produced in the country, 
the government issued a provision (August 1965) to regulate their distribution. More 
specifically, the rule imposed that the two varieties should be commercialised separately and 
                                               
27 There were many coups d’état that toppled several governments. For details see the appendix, Chapter 1, and 
Akindes, 2016. 
28 Other agricultural products, especially palm oil, were supported as well. For this purpose, the parastatal 
organisation Societe Nationale pour le Developpement Rural du Dahomey (SONADER), was created in 1961 to 
take over the management of agricultural production in the country. Another parastatal organisation, the Office de 
Commercialisation Agricole du Dahomey (OCAD), was created in 1962 to take over the management of the other 
components of the supply chain for these products (primary marketing, transport, processing, and export).  
29 We currently lack information on how the collection was organised before independence. 
30 Specific decisions were also taken as regards farmers. In June 1962, for instance, the government introduced 
a law imposing collective land for agriculture (champs collectifs) in each village in Benin. The idea was that 
groups of village farmers would join forces to generate income that would be used to finance local infrastructure. 
Besides these collective lands, however, farmers cultivated their individual land. Similar practices of local public 
goods financing were imposed by the colonial authorities through the organisations Société Indigène de 
Prévoyance (SIP) in 1929 and the Sociétés Mutuelles de Développement rural (SMDR) in the 1950s.  
31 The FS was initiated in parallel with the regional fund CSPC because the price support was seen to be 
insufficient for a number of cotton growers followed illegal route to export their production in neighbouring 
countries (Government of Benin, 1962).  
32 The lowest tax was applied to cotton (CFA 0.010 per Kg), whereas the highest was applied to groundnuts 
(CFA 0.75 per Kg). For palm oil products, the tax amounted to CFA 0.10 per Kg.  
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on different days in pre-defined local markets. In addition, two qualities of seed cotton were 
explicitly defined: high-quality cotton (1er choix), obtained from the current agricultural 
season and possessing attributes of homogeneity, whiteness, cleanness, and dryness; and 
low-quality cotton (2ème choix). Appointed controllers were charged with the task of 
identifying the quality of cotton offered for sale by any operator in the local market.  
The price of high-quality seed cotton was determined on the basis of the processing price of 
cotton lint from the past year. A forecast was then made regarding the processing cost for 
the next cotton season, but the quality of these estimations was only indicative. As for the 
price of low-quality seed cotton, following a proposition by FS, it was fixed by the 
government at a given ratio to the price of the high-quality product. This price-setting rule 
was thus not based on any consideration related to the growers’ production costs. Each 
year, FS transferred this price information to the government for announcement to the public.  
In the meantime, the Société D'Aide Technique et de Cooperation (SATEC) and the Bureau 
pour le développement de la production agricole (BDPA – created in 1950), two other 
French parastatals33, were established in central Benin (in the Zou and Collines 
departments) and the north-western area (in the Atacora and Donga departments), 
respectively, to take over the extension and technical services and the marketing of seed 
cotton (Sotindjo, 2017; World Bank, 1969). If the CFDT concentrated on the north-eastern (in 
the Alibori and Borgou departments) area for the realisation of these activities, it continued to 
be the main organisation for the processing and the exporting of all the cotton produced in 
Benin. 
To expand its cotton sector, Benin received support from the FAC and the FED during the 
period 1963–1970. However, most of the funding was directly handed by the French 
agencies. The CFDT concentrated its efforts on the Borgou-Alibori department and SATEC 
concentrated on the central region. The project financed one government ginnery factory in 
Parakou in the Borgou department in 1968. Furthermore, the IRCT continued its research 
activities in relation to high-yielding varieties in the stations of Mono and Parakou. As a 
result, between 1961 and 1969, production and acreage increased from 2,482 tonnes and 
20,608 ha to 23,959 tonnes and 31,884 ha, respectively.34 Concurrently, yields increased 
from 1,204 hectogram per hectare (hg/ha) to 7,514 hg/ha over the same period.  
Six cotton-processing factories, representing a total capacity of 60,000 tonnes, operated in 
Benin around the end of the 1960s (World Bank, 1972). This points to a serious problem of 
over-capacity since total production in the country was about 24,000 tonnes of seed cotton in 
1969. The CFDT owned four of these factories, two of which were located in the central 
region (Bohicon and Savalou) and two in the northern region (in Kandi and Djougou35). The 
government owned the two remaining factories: one in the South-West (Mono) and the other 
in the North (Parakou). Through an agreement with the government, the CFDT managed the 
ginnery in Parakou, in addition to the four factories under its ownership. The Societe 
Nationale pour le Developpement Rural du Dahomey (SONADER) operated the second 
government ginnery in Mono. Formally, the agreement with the government stipulated that 
                                               
33 The French parastatals are locally known in Benin as Société d’Intervention. 
34 The major increase, however, took place after 1966, when the project’s operations really started (see Figure 
1). The delay was due to administrative and technical difficulties (World Bank, 1969). These problems were partly 
related to the political instability of the time. 
35 The ginnery in Djougou become defective sometime in the 1960s or 1970s. 
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the CFDT was not allowed to purchase seed cotton from producers in the Mono region. 
However, it remained in charge of the export of all cotton lint processed in Benin, including 
the product processed by SONADER in the Mono region. In 1969, however, the 
responsibility for cotton exports was shifted from the CFDT to the Office de 
Commercialisation Agricole du Dahomey (OCAD). 
4.2 1971–1981: a public mode of organisation regulated by the 
Marxist-Leninist government 
The positive impulse of the 1960s continued its effect till 1972, when seed cotton reached a 
peak of 49,590 tonnes (left panel of Figure 1). Thereafter, production started declining, from 
1973, and reached a low level of 14,134 tonnes in 1981. We now detail a number of events 
that coincided with this poor performance of Benin’s cotton sector in 1973–1981.  
While the French parastatals (CFDT, SATEC, IRCT) contributed significantly to the 
development of the cotton sector in 1963–1972, their mode of operation was criticised on a 
number of points (World Bank 1970). For instance, the parastatals were blamed for their 
high operational costs, and for their single-crop development strategy, which ignored food 
crops and did not apply an integrated rural development approach in the areas of 
intervention. Moreover, the nationalist movement continued to grow, with the consequence 
that there was rising pressure to reduce foreign influence. In particular, the revolutionary 
government that took power in October 1972 promoted the ideas of ‘self-reliance’ and food 
self-sufficiency. Consequently, Beninese rural regional development agencies, known as the 
Centres d'Action Régional pour le Développement Rural (CARDERs), were promoted in the 
years 1969–1975, with a view to developing each department. This decision was taken in 
parallel to the creation in January 1971 of a national cotton agency, the Société Nationale 
Agricole pour le Coton (SONACO), charged with the development of the entire cotton sector 
in the country.  
In order to further expand the cotton sector, however, foreign assistance was necessary 
because the country lacked technical skills and financial resources. In this context, a new 
project was implemented from 1972 onwards, jointly financed by the government (24.5%), a 
grant from the FAC (27.5%), and credit from the International Development Association 
(IDA) for the remaining 48%. A primary objective of this project was to develop the activities 
of the newly created agency (SONACO), which was intended to progressively take over the 
management from the CFDT and SATEC of all activities in the cotton sector: technical and 
extension services, supply and distribution of inputs, processing, and marketing.36 Other 
activities of the project included the creation of a credit fund to finance inputs and equipment, 
the construction of two additional ginneries, and the rehabilitation of rural roads to facilitate 
the transport of cotton from the fields. 
An important condition imposed on SONACO was that it should work in collaboration with 
the three French parastatals already operating in the cotton sector: SATEC, the IRCT, and 
the CFDT. In a first phase, it was expected that SONACO would concentrate on the 
management of the procurement of inputs and the agricultural fund. In addition, SONACO 
                                               
36 Other activities of the project included the creation of a fund to provide credit for inputs and equipment, the 
construction of two additional ginneries, and the rehabilitation of rural roads to facilitate the transport of cotton 
from the fields. 
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would contract with the CFDT and SATEC (with the former for the North and with the latter 
for the central region) to manage the project at the regional level (distribution of inputs, 
technical and extension services, transport, marketing). Moreover, through a joint venture 
with the government, the CFDT would manage all the cotton ginneries in the country. A 
similar joint venture between the CFDT and government cotton agency was successfully 
created in other francophone West African cotton-producing countries. Finally, it was 
expected that the IRCT would pursue its research and development activities in relation to 
higher-yielding seed varieties.  
The project should have started in 1970 but serious institutional problems caused delays so 
that it was implemented only from January 1972. 37 In the beginning (1972), funds came from 
the FAC and the Government of Benin. As for IDA, it delayed its intervention until April 1973 
because of institutional hurdles. In particular, SONACO unilaterally decided to take over the 
direct control of the extension services in the field, in violation of the initial agreement to 
contract those activities to the CFDT and SATEC. Furthermore, skills shortages and 
management problems at the top level of SONACO were a hindrance to the project’s smooth 
unfolding. Also, with a new government coming to power (on 26 October 1972) there came 
big changes in the staffing of the government agencies. All these unforeseen changes 
increased uncertainty; hence the decision by IDA to postpone the disbursement of its funds. 
In the end, IDA’s decision was proved to be the right one because the cotton sector 
performed very poorly from that time onwards (see Figure 1).  
There are many reasons for the collapse of the cotton sector. First, SONACO was unable to 
adequately develop field activities, especially input supply and distribution. In particular, 
procurement problems (problems with the licensing of suppliers and non-transparent 
competitive bidding) caused delays in the delivery of inputs to farmers. Moreover, inputs 
were left unprotected in the port of Cotonou and their quality deteriorated after having been 
exposed to the rain. There were also problems in the delivery of ploughs. Furthermore, there 
were issues between producers and extension staff of SONACO, who were collectors of 
seed cotton at the village level. In particular, taking advantage of the illiteracy of the growers, 
some collectors tampered with the amount of cotton submitted by growers. All these 
problems were amplified when the CFDT and SATEC were forced to leave the country in 
1974, when the regime adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and put more emphasis on food 
crops. This is where Benin differs fundamentally from other francophone West African 
countries. As a consequence of these problems, farmers turned away from cotton, especially 
in the central region of the Zou-Collines, and they started to produce more maize for the 
Nigerian market, where demand noticeably increased following the first oil shock. This period 
marked the decline of cotton production in the central region that we highlighted above.  
                                               
37 Project preparation started in 1967 and its implementation should have started earlier, in 1970, but political 
instability, characterised by many government changes, caused delays in its definition and approval. The rule of 
Colonel Christophe Soglo, who seized power through a coup in November 1965, was interrupted by a coup 
executed by Colonel Kouandoté on 17 December 1967, then followed by another military coup, this time at the 
initiative of Alley on 21 December 1967. Alley organised a general election, the results of which were not 
validated, and Dr Zinsou was finally appointed as the new president in July 1968. Thereafter, a new coup was 
executed by Kouandoté in December 1969, followed by a new general election in 1970, which was again 
contested. Thereafter emerged the triumviate system of government first led by Maga (May 1970 to May 1972), 
then by Ahomadégbé (May 1972 to 26 October 1972), and finally by Kérékou. After Kérékou took power, several 
administrative bottlenecks delayed the effective start of the project till April 1973. 
Regulation of a Dominant Sector: A Case Study of Cotton 
© Economic Development & Institutions  18 
Changes in the other segments of the supply chain also compromised the performance of 
the sector. For instance, the fact that OCAD took over export activities from the CFDT had 
the effect of reducing the quality of cotton lint exported by Benin. The Société de 
Commercialisation et Crédit Agricole du Dahomey (SOCAD) replaced OCAD in 1972, and it 
also took over the management of the stabilisation fund FS. The change did not, however, 
improve the situation and the agencies continued to suffer from weak management 
problems. All these issues led the government and the donor to prematurely end the project 
around 1975. 
There were, however, three main positive outcomes from the project, which also affected the 
sector later on. First, one additional government ginnery (with a capacity of 18,000 tonnes) 
was constructed in 1972 in the central region (Glazoué). Second, the research unit IRCT 
developed new high-yielding varieties (although in 1973–1980 their effects on cotton yield 
were nullified by the disruption of inputs and extension services): BJA SM 67 and 444-2-70. 
Third, and most fundamentally, village groups of farmers known as Groupements Villageois 
(GV) were promoted in 1971 to take on some responsibilities in the cotton supply chain. GV 
do not use collective asset ownership (land and equipment), and neither do they practice 
common production; instead, they merely coordinate within their group the distribution of 
inputs and the primary marketing of seed cotton. For inputs, a joint liability system known as 
caution solidaire was introduced whereby farmers in each GV are jointly responsible for input 
credit to be recovered at the time of the primary marketing of cotton. As regards primary 
marketing, village collection centres were created where each GV sells its seed cotton jointly 
to the collector. The project introduced this change in order to counter the tampering with the 
amount of seed cotton by some collectors. For this purpose, the project initiated a training 
programme to develop GV’s skills in cotton weighing, as well as their literacy skills. GVs 
were paid for their involvement in the primary marketing, and revenue generated from that 
activity (‘ristournes’) was invested in rural infrastructure, such as schools, wells, and health 
centres.  
After having adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology in 1974, in 1977 the government initiated 
two new types of farmers groups. One was the Groupement Revolutionnaire a Vocation 
Cooperative (GRVC), which is similar to the GV in terms of asset ownership and production 
organisation but it produces food crops in addition to cotton. Moreover, GRVC promote 
production in block of the members’ plots and a high degree of centralisation of extension 
services. Second, the government promoted collectivist cooperatives known as 
Coopératives agricoles expérimentales de type socialiste (CAETS) and Coopératives 
agricoles de type socialiste (CATS).38 Over time, however, CAETS and CATS did not 
succeed because they were not able to attract the most efficient producers (see, e.g., 
Yérima and Affo, 2011). Moreover, there were mismanagement problems. Only GV and 
GRCV have survived till today. 
The Marxist-Leninist government also introduced institutional changes in the other steps of 
the supply chain of cotton. In 1976 SONACO was replaced by a new parastatal, Société 
Nationale d'Agriculture (SONAGRI), and the responsibilities of the later also included the 
management of inputs for food crops. In particular, SONAGRI was assigned the activities 
                                               
38 In the strategy developed by the government GRVC were expected to become CAETS at village level, which 
would themselves become CAETS at commune (district) level. In practice, however, CAETS and CATS did not 
succeed and only GV and GRCV have survived today.  
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related to processing and input supply in the cotton chain. In contrast, extension services 
were from then on transferred to the development agencies, CARDERs. In the same period 
SOCAD was renamed Société Nationale pour la Commercialisation et l'Exportation du Bénin 
(SONACEB) in 1976 and a new stabilisation fund, the Fonds autonome de stabilisation et de 
soutien des prix des produits agricoles (FAS), was created in the same year. Following these 
additional changes, cotton production deteriorated further, from 30,654 tonnes in 1974 to a 
very low level of 14,134 tonnes in 1981. Moreover, the financial accounts of the government 
agencies (CARDERs, SONAGRI, and SONACEB) continued to be problematic.  
Around the end of 1977, however, the government took a renewed interest in cotton and 
called upon the support of donors. As such, a technical assistance programme was 
implemented in 1977–1981 to prepare new development projects. The assistance 
programme was financed by IDA (50%), FAC (31.25%), and the government (18.75%).   
4.3 1981–1991: public mode of organisation; government 
agencies were restructured and reorganised 
In 1981–1991 the cotton sector recovered strongly, as can be seen from the left panel of 
Figure 1: seed cotton increased almost eightfold over the period. This outcome was the 
result of four new projects that were developed by the government in collaboration with five 
donors (IDA, Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement (BOAD), Caisse Centrale de 
Cooperation Economique (CCCE)39, the International Fund for Agricultural (IFAD), and the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)).  
The projects strengthened the capacity of the cotton sector both at the national and regional 
levels. At the national level, they helped in restructuring and reorganising the existing 
government agencies in the cotton sector. As such, in 1983, FAS, SONACEB, and 
SONAGRI were replaced by a single new organisation, The Sociéte Nationale pour la 
Production Agricole (SONAPRA), which became responsible for the management of input 
supply40 as well as the final marketing of cotton. In addition to these institutional reforms, the 
government increased producer prices from around CFA 80 in 1981 to CFA 100 in 1982–
1984, and to CFA 110 in 1985–1986.41  
At the regional level the projects helped in strengthening the capacities of the CARDERs and 
the producer groups. In this respect, the first project concentrated on the Borgou region 
(1981–1988), the second targeted the Zou region, and the third focused on the Atacora 
region (1983–1988). Finally, the fourth project was a follow-up of the first project in the 
Borgou region (1988–1991). Hence, the most productive Borgou region received more 
support, which contributed further to the development of the region.  
In 1981, the government transferred to the CARDERs all activities related to the transport 
and the processing of cotton, although these functions were formerly under the responsibility 
                                               
39 The CCCE is the French development cooperation agency, which holds a share in the CFDT. The CCCE 
became the Caisse Francaise de Développement (CFD) in 1992 and the AFD in 1998.  
40 The input supply was managed through a procurement system with international bidding. We do not currently 
have details about the firms that were assigned the import of input supply.  
41 It seems that the government reduced subsidies on inputs during that period but it is currently difficult to check 
this information.  
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of SONAGRI and should therefore have been passed on to SONAPRA. In addition, the 
CARDERs continued to manage extension services and the primary marketing of cotton, in 
collaboration with the GVs. Women’s groups were also promoted for the first time during this 
project. For extension services, a training and visit (TV42) system was introduced in the 
fields. The projects supported the training of the CARDERs’ staff and the GV members, 
which facilitated input delivery and the provision of extension services to farmers. Moreover, 
the projects supported the acquisition of equipment by farmers and the construction of rural 
roads.  
Following these institutional changes and the producer price incentive that was provided 
during the period cotton production increased substantially from 14,134 to 88,098 tonnes in 
1984, surpassing for the first time the ginnery capacity of 72,000 tonnes. From then, 
production further increased to 132,762 tonnes in 1986. In 1987, however, the sector 
experienced a crisis that caused production to regress to 70,203 tonnes. The crisis had to do 
with three main issues. First, Figure 2 shows a strong decrease of the dollar value of the 
world cotton price and a deep depreciation of the US dollar in 1984–1986. As a result, the 
CFA value of export revenue of the cotton sector depressed. Second, weak financial 
management by SONAPRA and the CARDERs combined with the continued support of the 
producer price value of CFA 110 led to a depletion of resources of the stabilisation fund in 
1985. In this context, the further decrease of world cotton prices that occurred in 1986 could 
no longer be absorbed by the stabilisation fund without external funding because the 
government itself was also experiencing financial problems. The mis-allocation of the 
stabilisation fund included: excessive prefinancing of the working capital for CARDERs; and 
transport and other logistics by SONAPRA to manage the excess production of cotton. 
Moreover, the debt of SONAPRA and the CARDERs with respect to the banking sector and 
external suppliers stood at about CFA 7.6 billion. The cotton sector was therefore bankrupt 
in 1986. 
In order to resolve this situation, a restructuring programme for the cotton sector was 
implemented in 1987–1991. The programme was executed by the government in 
collaboration with four donors (IDA, CFA, IFAD, and BOARD) within the framework of the 
second Borgou project, where money was provided to absorb the debt of SONAPRA and the 
CARDERs. An important condition imposed by the donors on the government in this 
restructuring programme was that external technical assistance should be mobilised to 
assist the management of cotton agencies. The CFDT was thus called to provide technical 
and managerial assistance to SONAPRA and the CARDERs. The programme included three 
main reforms. First, the management of ginnery factories was transferred from the 
CARDERs to SONAPRA. As such, SONAPRA gained control of the main activities of the 
cotton sector and the CARDERs were left with the status of SONAPRA subcontractors, to 
manage field activities. From then on, the cotton sector became integrated around the 
monopole SONAPRA, as was the case with the CFDT before 1972. A similar change 
occurred in other former francophone exporters of cotton, but Benin was different because 
unlike those countries the CFDT had no ownership share in SONAPRA. This was the case 
because the CFDT was forced by the Marxist-Leninist regime to leave the country in 1974.  
                                               
42 TV is a management method for organising extension services in a way that establishes a personal 
relationship between an extension agent and a farmer. The extension agent regularly visits the farmer (every one 
or two weeks) to provide advice on any matter related to the activities in the production cycle. Unsolved problems 
are reported back to the extension service for advice or research to find solutions. 
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Second, the stabilisation fund became the Fonds de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des 
Produits agricoles (FSS) and was passed on to an independent management committee. 
Moreover, the producer price-setting rule was reformed to include a price floor, which was 
announced by the government before the sowing season around April. The determination of 
the price floor was based on an opaque rule which took into account the financial viability of 
the whole cotton sector. If the export price exceeded the cost (producer price and other 
costs of the cotton sector) in a given year the benefice was distributed in the next year 
among producers, SONAPRA, the FSS, and the government, according to a pre-defined 
sharing rule. There were, however, some problems with the implementation of this new rule. 
In particular, the determination of the price floor was not transparent. Moreover, the price 
floor was not directly related to the world cotton price, such that the FSS was not always 
able to stabilise strong adverse price shocks. In any case, the government reduced the 
producer price from CFA 110 to CFA 100 in 1987 in order to contribute to the financial 
viability of the system. Moreover, input and seed distribution were limited to the high-yielding 
regions in 1987. As a consequence of these two measures seed cotton production reduced 
considerably in 1987.  
Third, various reforms were initiated to strengthen the administrative and financial 
procedures of SONAPRA and the CARDERs. For instance, internal audit units were 
established in these agencies in order to regularly check their financial viability. In the same 
way, administrative and accounting procedures were put in place to manage their invoicing 
systems. Furthermore, working capital was provided to SONAPRA and the CARDERs. 
Following these reforms, the sector’s performance improved significantly. For instance, the 
reorganisation of the government agencies helped in reducing operating costs and the 
export marketing procedure (World Bank, 1995). Cotton production surged from 70,203 
tonnes in 1987 to 177,123 tonnes in 1991.43 In the same way, the GV’s revenue increased 
from their participation in the primary marketing, which they used to further finance local 
infrastructure. The promotion of women’s groups may also have increased their voice in 
matters related to rural development in the cotton-producing areas. One of the first careful 
microeconomic analysis of the ‘impact’ of these reforms in the Borgou region claims that 
women gained the most from these changes, because they were previously less involved in 
the cotton value chain (Bruntrup, 1997).  
The sector realised this performance despite the fact that world cotton prices continued to 
decline over the period. However, it was not clear whether without the second Borgou 
project the sector would be able survive a similar crisis in the future. Hence discussions 
started between the government and the main donors to privatise and liberalise the cotton 
sector. The context was also characterised by a structural adjustment programme that 
began in 1989 and the political transition towards a democratic regime with the national 
conference in February 1990. A new constitution was adopted in the same year and a 
market economy was re-established. Hence, a new institutional framework for the agriculture 
sector was elaborated in the Lettre de déclaration de politique de développement rural 
(LDPDR) by the government in June 1991, after Soglo won the first presidential election in 
April 1991.44 The LDPDR stipulated that the government should transfer the main functions 
                                               
43 In the meantime, two ginneries were constructed for SONAPRA in Borgou to address the under-capacity 
problem: one in Banikoara and the other in Bemberekè. These were financed by IDA and CCCE.  
44 The first parliamentarian election took place in February 1991. 
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of the supply chain to the private sector (primary and final marketing, supply and distribution 
of inputs, and processing).  
4.4 1992–1999: public mode of organisation under liberalisation 
of inputs and ginnery functions 
Following the LDPDR, Benin began the liberalisation of the cotton sector in 1992 under the 
Soglo regime which ruled the country till 3 April 1996. A gradual approach was taken. First, 
the input function was gradually liberalised in 1992–1995. Second, the private sector was 
licensed to operate in the processing component, starting from 1995. Third, the government 
initiated a broader agricultural restructuring project, the Projet de restructuration des services 
agricoles (PRSA), in 1992–1999. PRSA aimed to promote a better quality of agricultural 
services by the private sector in the context of structural adjustment programmes that 
prescribed the reduction of government in various sectors of the economy. In the framework 
of PRSA many extension agents of the CARDERs were fired. In order to strengthen the 
capacity of the producers to take over new responsibilities in the sector, the Fédération des 
producteurs du Bénin (FUPRO-Benin) was created in 1994 as the national professional 
trade union of the GV (Wennink et al., 2013). The project was supported by seven donors 
(the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), FED, AFD, the German Technical 
Cooperation, Agency (GTZ), IFAD, the United Nations Development Programme, and 
BOAD).  
The liberalisation of the input component proceeded gradually from 20% in 1992 to 100% in 
1995. In 1992–1994 SONAPRA was responsible for the residual shares of input supply. The 
details of the liberalisation were as follows:  
i. In 1992 20% of input supply and distribution was attributed to the private firm Société 
de Distribution Internationale (SDI), of which Talon was a major shareholder.  
ii. In 1993 the share of SDI increased to 40%. 
iii. In 1994 60% were attributed to the private sector now to be shared among two firms: 
- SDI obtained 50%; and 
- a new firm, Société africaine de management, d’affrètement et de commerce 
(SAMAAC) entered with 10% but it seems that it collaborated with SDI. 
iv. In 1995 100% of input supply was transferred to the private sector, as follows: 
- SDI (46%), SAMAAC 15%), Société des industries cotonnières du Bénin 
(SODICOT) (15%); Société générale pour l’industrie et le commerce (SOGICOM 
(8%); and Fruits et Textiles (FRUITEX) Industries (16%). 
The selection procedure of these firms for the input supply was done by SONAPRA 
according to its procurement system, which was limited to Beninese firms in the liberalisation 
process.45 Why did the government not allow foreign firms to compete directly with the 
domestic firms? There are suggestive indications that the procurement and licensing 
procedures were not totally transparent. For instance, in a recent open letter in 2018 the 
then president Soglo argued that he took the cotton activities from the CFDT and assigned 
the input supply activities to a group of 10 entrepreneurs, including Benin’s current president 
Talon.46 Moreover, in 1992, SDI received directly the inputs from SONAPRA and it only 
                                               
45 Only the declining residual share was procured with international firms. 
46 See details of the letter here: www.jeuneafrique.com/560768/politique/benin-nicephore-soglo-repond-a-jeune-
afrique/ 
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reimbursed it afterwards (Yérima and Affo, 2015). It is also interesting to see that the number 
of firms increased greatly in 1995. We do not yet have a clear understanding of why this 
happened. However, 1995 was the year of the second parliamentarian election in Benin and 
it is possible that the competition to win that election could be related to the one to enter the 
input market.  
In addition to these reforms, the CFA value of the world cotton price improved following the 
rise of the dollar value of the world cotton price and the CFA’s 50% devaluation in 1994 
(Figure 2). Figure 4 shows that the producer price also increased over the period but the gap 
between the two series became wider over the second half of the 1990s.47 Following these 
changes cotton production continued its increase further after 1991 and reached a high 
value of 430,398 tonnes in 1996. The improvement in cotton production was such that Benin 
outperformed Burkina Faso in 1993–1996, and there was an under-capacity ginnery problem 
in 1994.   
Note, however, that this improvement in cotton production was primarily driven by land 
extension. In particular, while yields increased in 1993, they declined in 1994 and followed a 
declining trend till 1998. Several explanations can be provided for declining yields in that 
period. First, the result could be due to the price effect of imported inputs following the CFA 
devaluation. As the price of inputs increased producers were likely to reduce their input 
consumption and this could have potentially caused yield to decrease. Second, this outcome 
could relate to liberalisation having reached more farmers and hence the observed increase 
in land area. If the newcomer-farmers were less efficient in cotton production or if they 
applied the cotton input for other crops, average cotton yields would have decreased. Third, 
the new private input suppliers could have been less efficient in managing and distributing 
inputs, causing delays in supply inputs or supplying a lower quality of inputs.  
After president Kérékou took power on 4 April 1996, the number of private firms that 
obtained a licence to distribute inputs in the cotton sector further increased to 11 in 1996 and 
12 in 1998. It is possible that this increase was related to the competition for the presidential 
election of 1996 in the sense that the Kérékou regime wanted to compensate some 
entrepreneurs for their support in winning that election. In the absence of clear evidence, this 
remains speculative, however. In any case the quality of inputs has deteriorated since the 
increased number of private firms in 1997–1998. Part of the explanation is that some of the 
newcomers were less efficient. We further elaborate on other institutional causes below. We 
first discuss the liberalisation of the processing component.  
In order to address the under-capacity problem of the processing factories the Soglo regime 
initiated a liberalisation in 1995, when three new private ginnery factories of 25,000 tonnes 
capacity each obtained their licence to operate in Benin: ICB at Pehunco (Atacora); CCB in 
Kandi (Borgou); and SOCOBE in Bohicon (Zou). These three private factories are known as 
first generation (of the liberalisation period) ginneries.48 They were granted a number of 
preferential treatments by the government. First, they obtained a preferential investment 
code regime (régime C), which grants a 100% tax exoneration on profit and an exoneration 
of duty on imported equipment and intermediate inputs for about seven years. Second, 
according to a regulation SONAPRA buys seed cotton from farmers and sells them to the 
                                               
47 The devaluation also made the inputs more expensive in CFA franc terms, but we do not have the necessary 
information to further pursue this analysis here.  
48 It seems that the current President Talon is the owner of these three gin factories. 
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private ginneries. This implies that SONAPRA supported part of the risk that should normally 
be taken by the producers and the private ginneries. Third, the amount of seed cotton to be 
allocated to the private firms should be proportional to their ginnery capacity and the total 
seed cotton production. Fourth, SONAPRA contributed 35% to the capital of each of these 
three private ginneries. Applying these preferential treatments created problems in the future 
when the number of gin factories increased.  
In 1997–1998, the Kérékou regime granted licences to the second generation of ginnery 
factories. Their total capacity ranged from 40,000 to 60,000 tonnes. These included three 
new factories for SONAPRA (one ginnery in Bohicon in the Zou department and two 
ginneries in Parakou49 in the Borgou department) and five new private factories (IBECO in 
Kétou (Patteau); LCB in Pouipnan (Zou); SEICB in Savalou (Collines), Marlan's Cotton 
Industry (MCI) in Nikki; and SODICOT in Ndali (Borgou)). This gives a total of 18 gin 
factories, of which 10 were owned SONAPRA and the remaining eight were owned by the 
private sector. With these new gin factories in business, there was again over-capacity, with 
a total capacity of 442,500 tonnes compared to a production of 377,370 tonnes. In 1998 the 
gin capacity further increased to 587,500. The management of this over-capacity problem 
has been a major issue facing the Benin cotton sector. Figure 5 displays the location of the 
18 gin factories.  
Following these changes, production started on a declining trend from 1997 onwards. The 
decrease in 1996 and 1997 was not systematically related to the producer price, which did 
not decline. The producer price even increased from 1997 to 1998, despite the fact that the 
world price marginally decreased (Figures 2 and 4). This implies that an alternative factor 
was responsible for the decrease in cotton production. A number of governance problems 
coincided with this poor performance. We first briefly discuss the change in producer prices 
and later elaborate on the factors behind the decline of cotton production. In April 1996 the 
FSS was replaced by the Office Nationale de stabilization et de soutien des prix aux 
producteurs (ONS) and a new price-setting rule came into effect. The new rule took into 
account the world price of cotton and also explicitly defined a margin for each of the main 
actors along the supply chain: producer; input supply and distribution, and ginnery factories.  
As regards governance issues, the cotton sector experienced two conflicts in 1996–1997. 
The first conflict involved the government and the first generation of gin factories. In 1995 the 
private ginnery factories accumulated a lot of profit given the high production of cotton 
processed but also because the CFA devaluation implied a high value of the world cotton 
price in CFA, but producer prices only marginally increased.50 Given, however, that the firms 
were granted a preferential tax regime an agreement was reached between the government 
and the firms that firms would exceptionally contribute to government revenue in that year in 
the amount of 35 CFA per kg of cotton processed. In compensation for this contribution the 
agreement stated a decrease in the share of the government in the capital of those firms 
from 35% to 10%. When the Kérékou regime came in in 1996 the preferential tax treatment 
to these firms was reversed and the government wanted firms to continue to make the 35 
CFA per kg contribution. The firms contested this in the judicial court (as well as the 
                                               
49 One of the new factories replaced the old government ginnery in Parakou.  
50 Lower producer share price following the CFA devaluation was also observed in other West African countries. 
It was criticised and fuelled further pressure for reforming the cotton sector in these countries (e.g. Badiane et al., 
2002, Baghdadli et al., 2007) 
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Constitutional and the Supreme Courts) and when they won the Kérékou government’s 
action was reversed.  
The second conflict started in 1997 and related to issues between SONAPRA and the first 
private input providers (SDI and SAMAAC). The issues led SONAPRA to exclude these two 
companies from the input procurement in 1997. Following this decision SDI and SAMACC 
brought the case to the judicial court (and the Supreme Court), where they won. In addition, 
SONAPRA had to pay fines to these firms but an agreement was reached between the two 
parties. The agreement stipulated that SDI and SAMACC would take 50% of the input 
supply. This decision was applied from 1998 onwards and it contributed to further conflict 
because the other suppliers were left with a lower amount of input to be supplied; they 
contested this rule. This situation led to increased problems in the input component: higher 
price of input, lower quality of input, and delays in the distribution of inputs (e.g. Bidaux and 
Soulé, 2005).  
Figure 7: Ownership of ginnery factories in 1998 (left) and 2012 (right) 
  
Sources: The left-hand map is from World Bank (2004) and the one to the right is from Fludor Benin (2012). The 
ICA group and SODECO are now part of the same group. In 2017 the MCI factory was taken over by SODECO. 
Finally, a new gin factory (not shown on the map), with a capacity of 12,500 tonnes, was created in Parakou in 
2018. This gives a total of 600,000 tonnes capacity for Benin. 
In order to resolve the problems a number of actions were taken to privatise the 
management of the cotton sector. In 1998, for instance, the producer organisation FUPRO 
created the Coopérative d'Approvisionnement et de Gestion des Intrants Agricoles (CAGIA), 
to which the government transferred the management of input supply and distribution in 
Regulation of a Dominant Sector: A Case Study of Cotton 
© Economic Development & Institutions  26 
1999. Other professional associations were created in 1999: the Association Professionnelle 
des Egraineurs du Bénin (APEB) for ginners, the CAGIA for the management of input quotas 
between private firms, and the AIC for the management of the whole supply chain.  
4.5 2000–2007: private mode of organisation by AIC 
The important rules of the privatisation were decided at a national workshop in May 2000, 
which saw the participation of the sector’s representatives. The seminar decided between 
two modes of private governance for cotton: i) a unique private and vertically integrated 
mode of organisation at the country level; and ii) a private integrated mode of organisation at 
the regional level. Stakeholders decided in favour of the first mode. Moreover, a number of 
rules were put in place, such as fixed prices for inputs and cotton seeds across the whole 
country.  
In June 2000 the government suspended the monopole of SONAPRA on primary marketing 
but it continued to manage its 10 ginneries. Primary marketing was thus passed on to the 
Centrale de Sécurisation des Paiements et de Recouvrement (CSPR), which played a key 
institutional regulatory role in achieving the recovery of input loans to farmers and the 
payment of cotton seeds purchased by ginners. A development project funded by the World 
Bank, the Projet d’Appui à la Réforme de la Filière Coton (PARFC), was implemented in 
2002–2007 by the inter-professional cotton association (AIC) to strengthen their capacity. 
One important change in this period was the fact that AIC started to manage the critical51 
functions of the cotton’s sector, including technical and extension services that were 
previously under the responsibility of the CARDERs. It was also in the context where the 
CARDERs had to fire many workers as required by the PRSA project. As a result, AIC had 
to recruit private extension agents, which had to join forces with the remaining CARDERs 
technical staff to do the extension work. Figure 8 below summarises the organisational 
changes in the cotton sector before 1990 and after the liberalisations of the 1990s and the 
AIC period in 2000.  
It is striking that this period of intense organisational change did not have any effect on 
cotton production. Moreover, conflicts emerged among the actors starting from 2002–2003. 
For instance, farmers complained about expensive input prices. In the same way, a number 
of private firms contested the outcomes of the input procurement procedure, whereas some 
ginneries found fault with the quotas of cotton seeds. As a result, they boycotted the AIC-
CSPR-GARCIA system and started parallel activities. For instance, the dissident distributors 
attracted some farmers by proposing lower prices than what the official system was offering. 
However, the quality of the output delivered was not properly monitored. Likewise, the 
quality of privately supplied inputs could not be guaranteed and producers frequently 
complained that they were cheated in this regard. The ground was laid for a genuine crisis in 
the cotton sector. In particular, a lot of confusion was generated by the plurality of input 
sources and output outlets, and a number of farmers and ginners became severely indebted 
as the CSPR could no longer track their activities. The cotton sector in Benin thus 
experienced the side-selling problem discussed in Section 2. As a consequence, the system 
encountered delays in payments, which discouraged farmers. Many of them turned away 
from cotton production, which was depressed in 2005. The GV also experienced conflicts. 
                                               
51 The other critical functions include: research for new variety development; quality control; production and 
distribution of cotton seed; statistical data production; rural road maintenance. 
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The joint liability performed poorly and farmers also complained about poor financial 
management by their leaders. Another issue experienced by the sector was poor extension 
services because there were coordination problems between the private extension agents 
recruited by AIC and the ones that used to work in the CARDERs. The private agents also 
lacked technical skills. In fact, all the critical functions were under serious problems during 
that period.  
The government’s reaction consisted of stepping in to finance the debt shortfall. Moreover, it 
introduced in 2006 institutional reforms to strengthen the professional associations. The 
producer organisation became the Conseil National des Producteurs de Coton (CNPC) and 
was limited to cotton producers, in contrast to the old FUPRO; the association of the input 
distributors became the Conseil National des Importateurs et Distributeurs d’Intrants Coton 
(CNIDIC); CAGIA was replaced by the Centrale d’Achat des Intrants agricoles (CAI); and, 
finally, the organisation of gin factories was replaced by the Conseil National des Égreneurs 
(CNEC). Furthermore, the government adopted a framework agreement (Accord-cadre) in 
2006 with AIC, but with no significant effect on the sector’s performance.  
In April 2007 the newly elected president (Yayi Boni) dissolved the agreement with AIC and 
an ad hoc Commission Nationale was established to manage cotton inputs. Moreover, the 
government allowed SONAPRA in that year to compete for input supply with private firms. 
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Figure 8: Changes in organisational structure of the cotton before 1992 and after the liberalisation of the 1990s and from 2000 
 
Sources: Adapted from Honfoga (2013) 
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4.6 2008–2012: private mode of organisation and privatisation of 
SONAPRA 
In 2008, the industrial assets of SONAPRA were privatised and a new group, known as the 
Société de Développement du Coton (SODECO), was created to take over these assets 
after several problems in procurement management became manifest in 2006–2007. A first 
attempt to privatise these assets of SONAPRA failed in 2004–2005. The second also failed 
in 2007 due to problems involving a violation of the regularity procedure. SODECO was 
created as a joint venture between the government, accounting for a share of 66.5%, and a 
private company led by Talon, accounting for the remaining share of 33.5%.  
In 2008 the government granted another licence for a new ginnery factory, SCN, in N’dali 
(Borgou) adding a capacity of 40,000 tonnes, despite the fact that the processing component 
was already experiencing an over-capacity problem. In 2009, a new framework agreement 
was signed between the government and AIC. 
Overall, the domination by Talon’s group further increased in the sector because it merged 
with the majority of gin factories to create the ICA group. Consequently, the sector came 
under the control of a private monopoly. The government continued, however, to intervene in 
the sector. Moreover, the new organisational changes failed to improve the situation in 
Benin’s cotton sector. Yields and the cultivated area remained low.  
4.7 2012–2016: public mode of organisation is back 
In April 2012 an international commission reported serious management problems by AIC. 
The problems included an over-estimation of the value of input supplied in the field, under-
estimation of seed cotton submitted at gin factories, and mismanagement of government 
subsidies. Hence, the government cancelled the agreement signed in 2009 with AIC and a 
public mode of organisation took over its management. An inter-ministerial commission 
assumed the responsibilities of AIC, and SONAPRA and ONS were the main operational 
organisations. This new public management remained in place till April 2016, when 
President Yayi Boni finished his term. During this period the cotton sector continued to 
suffer, however. One positive change perhaps was a strategy introduced to check input 
consumption in the field. The national statistics institute went into the field with GPS to check 
accurately the size of land area of cotton in order to verify the input consumption requested. 
Several times discrepancies were found, and the additional money was recovered. This 
system continues to be implemented today. 
4.8 2016–present: private mode of organisation remains back 
In May 2016 President Talon re-established AIC after he was voted into office in April. An 
audit requested by the Talon government reported several mismanagement problems in the 
public governance of the cotton sector in 2012–2016. The new regime abolished around 10 
agricultural government agencies, including SONAPRA, ONS, and the CARDERs. 
Moreover, it initiated a broader reform agenda in the agricultural sector, where nine new 
regional development agencies were created. In addition, the government abolished 
subsidies to the cotton sector.  
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During the institutional survey developed for Chapter 3 the experts were not enthusiastic 
about these reforms.52 Since 2016, however, seed cotton production has been increasing 
according to data published by INSAE53 (451,000 tonnes in 2016 and 597,985 tonnes for 
2017) and AIC (656,460 tonnes in 2018). These figures suggest that the sector has been 
improving in the last three years. The data presented in reports by the Programme Regional 
de Production Intégrée du Coton en Afrique (PR-PICA) also confirm this improvement in 
2016-2018. The available information from AIC and INSAE indicate that the recent 
improvement can be explain by increase in both yields and acreage. Other this period (2016-
2018) the producer price has not changed. As a result, this recent improvement in 
production, yields and acreage could be related to changes on the organisation and the 
management of the sector by AIC and the government.  
It is too early to further elaborate on the recent performance as we currently lack information 
in this regard; we therefore leave this analysis for future research. Gérald Estur, an expert 
who is familiar with the issues the African’s cotton is facing, argued in May 2019 that this 
recent improvement in Benin’s cotton performance is related to changes in the management 
of the sector since the new government took power over the last three years. According to 
the expert, the changes have helped to restore trust among the stakeholders in the sector. 
The changes include: a vertically integrated coordination approach by the government; 
timely payment of cotton growers; and efficient delivery of inputs.54  
                                               
52 During the survey the experts had to provide a score between a value 0 (strongly negative opinion) and 4 
(strongly positive opinion) on questions related to institutional performance. In addition, respondents were 
allowed to reply with ‘I do not know’ when they could not provide relevant answers to a question. The average 
score value related to the reform in the agricultural sector was around 2 and 23% of respondents either reported 
a neutral opinion or did not answer the question. See chapter 3 for more detail. 
53 See this link for details https://www.insae-bj.org/statistiques/statistiques-economiques 
54 See here for details http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20190517-le-benin-nouveau-champion-coton-africain 
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5 Concluding remarks 
The cotton sector presents a unique opportunity to understand the causes and 
consequences of institutional changes in Benin over a long historical period. The sector has 
operated under different modes of organisation, oscillating between public and private 
monopolies over time as summarized in Table 2 below. Initially, the cotton sector was 
managed by French entrepreneurs. From the end of the 1940s the sector came under the 
control of a French parastatal monopoly, the CFDT, which helped to modernise the sector 
with the support of development aid. In 1972, the Marxist-Leninist regime of Kérékou 
nationalised the CFDT, which was replaced by a number of government agencies. The 
system thus disintegrated, which increased coordination costs and resulted in poor 
performance. Thereafter, the sector entered a first restructuring period in the early 1980s 
and the government agencies were re-integrated back into a single state agency, 
SONAPRA. Poor management problems and adverse world price shocks undermined the 
sector’s performance in 1986. After another restructuring plan the sector started a 
liberalisation period in 1992, after the country achieved a successful democratic transition in 
1990. In particular, a liberalisation plan was implemented in 1992–1998 and private 
Beninese entrepreneurs started operating in the inputs and ginnery components of the 
sector. Thereafter, the sector experienced a crisis from the late 1990s and an inter-
professional association of private entrepreneurs, AIC, became responsible for the 
management of the sector in 2000–2006, but the government continued to play an important 
role. In 2007 a new government suspended AIC. Thereafter, SONAPRA was privatised in 
2008 and a dominant private group emerged. AIC became responsible again for the sector 
in 2009 but new problems in the sector led the government to suspend ACI from 2012 until 
2016, when AIC was again given the management of the sector. 
What are the common causes of these institutional changes? What are the common 
institutional weaknesses in the cotton sector in Benin? What are their consequences for 
economic development in Benin? Can Benin develop a long-term development strategy 
based on cotton?  
5.1 Institutional changes and institutional weaknesses: causes 
and consequences 
There are a number of institutional weaknesses that can be derived from the foregoing 
analysis in the chapter: the discontinuity of regulations, reforms, policies, planned actions, or 
mandates of an organisation; the weak regulation of businesses (privatisation and 
liberalisation, licence management, financial management, accounting and auditing 
systems); weak capacity in public administration (including issues related to data 
management); vulnerability to world price shocks; excessive government and political 
interference; political appointments; overlapping responsibility; weak coordination; and 
imperfect credit markets, asymmetric information, and weak contract enforcement. These 
weaknesses are potentially caused by rent-seeking; election and mass support; low 
technical and financial capacity; donors’ ideologies and their interests; poor management of 
conflict of interest; the ideology of political actors; colonisation and national anti-colonial 
revolution; culture; weak campaign financing; power concentration at the executive level; 
and distortions caused by subsidies in the dominant world cotton producers. We will now 
elaborate on a few of these institutional bottlenecks.
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Discontinuity of regulations, reforms, policies, planned actions, or mandates 
of cotton organisations  
This characterises a situation in which a government abruptly overturns existing regulations, 
reforms, policies, planned actions by the previous government, or re-assigns the mandates 
of organisations in the cotton sector. This type of institutional weakness has been common 
over the whole historical period. In 1972, for instance, the military regime unexpectedly 
reversed the agreed decision between donors and the previous government that SONACO 
would contract with the CFDT and SATEC to manage field activities (distribution of inputs, 
technical and extension services, transport, marketing). In the same way the governance of 
AIC was sharply interrupted several times by successive governments in the period 2006–
2016. Furthermore, SONAPRA suddenly reappeared in input supply and distribution in 2007 
and 2012–2016, whereas a regulation already excluded it from participating in these 
activities in 1995.  
Several factors may cause this type of institutional bottleneck: for instance, the Marxist-
Leninist ideology of the revolutionary regime of the 1970s, the pronounced anti-colonial 
revolution at that time, and rent-seeking by supporters of the regime may explain why the 
CFDT did not continue to play a dominant role in the cotton sector in Benin but instead 
SONACO and other newly created government agencies suddenly took over the 
responsibilities. In the same way, rent-seeking, weak campaign financing, and electoral 
institutions, as well as the poor regulation of businesses, that characterise Benin may 
promote business-politics clientelist contracts, as elaborated in Chapter 4, and this could 
potentially explain the conflicts that emerged following the liberalisation and privatisation of 
the cotton sector in the 1990s. The dominant power of the new actors in the cotton sector, 
the excessive power of the executive, together with weak campaign financing and electoral 
institutions, could in turn explain the fluctuation between the public and private types of 
governance that we have witnessed since the 2000s.  
This institutional weakness causes an increase in uncertainty in the cotton sector and 
increases the cost of agriculture services and the quality of input required by the farmers. As 
a result, it will discourage the production of cotton and/or induce low yield, which in turn will 
undermine the welfare of producers.   
Weak capacity in public administration, colonisation, donors’ ideology and 
their interests 
Donors, essentially France and the World Bank, have played a key role in the development 
of the cotton sector in Benin. The French colonisation and the interest of France to 
outsource its industries were the first explaining causes of the development of the modern 
cotton industry in Benin. The French cotton institutions, such as the vertical integrated 
system of the value chain and the price stabilisation mechanism, initiated in the colonial 
period continue to persist today in Benin. Because the public administration of Benin has 
weak capacity, Benin requested the World Bank to join forces in developing the cotton sector 
further. The World Bank’s view of the organisation of the value chain is a bit different from 
that of France in that it promotes a competitive-type system. The World Bank’s view has 
dominated in the institutional choices made for the management of Benin’s cotton sector 
because the Marxist-Leninist government undermined the French interests in the 1970s 
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because of anti-colonial sentiment that was observed at that time. Moreover, the pioneer role 
of Benin in its democratic transition and market economy in francophone Africa further 
contributed to making Benin different in the liberalisation and privatisation process in the 
cotton sector in West Africa.  
In the 1990s, however, the liberalisation and privatisation of Benin’s cotton sector generated 
problems as explained above. These problems then attracted more donors to the sector, as 
can be seen from Figure 9 below. If the new donors differed also in ideology as regards the 
organisation of the cotton sector then the increase in the number of donors could be 
expected to have increased the coordination cost to manage the influx of aid in the sector, 
and also further contribute to the problem the sector experienced. In the absence of 
evidence for this, however, this remains speculative. 
Figure 9: Donors supporting Benin’s cotton sector (number) 
 
Source:  Hougni and Moreira (2019).  
5.2 Long-term development issues 
We end the analysis with a discussion of two issues. First, is the current mode of 
organisation of the Benin cotton sector the most welfare-enhancing for the country? Second, 
should Benin still rely on cotton for its long-term development strategy?  
On the first question, the current system of a national integrated value chain is certainty less 
efficient than the alternative of regionalisation in the management of cotton’s activities. It is 
now clear why the former was selected at the national workshop in May 2000. The other 
francophone countries in West Africa (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali) currently 
operate with a regionalisation system, although a pan-national pricing system is still in place 
in a number of them. Perhaps one explanation for Benin’s choice is because the system has 
created a dominant player that was afraid to lose power if the management were to be 
regionalised at that time, when the privatisation of SONAPRA had not taken place. The 
national integrated system is inefficient because cotton issues are being addressed in the 
same manner in the country as if the region producing areas were the same. We know, 
however, that the regions are different. For instance, because the Zou-Collines region’s 
climatic conditions generate humidity more specific solutions should target the region. As a 
result, the research body should develop specific crop varieties that resist against the 
specific crop disease of each region instead of imposing a unique crop variety for the whole 
country as is currently done. In a recent study, Hougni et al (2016) show among seven 
varieties of cotton, E 944-2; E 956-2; H 769-5; H 782-3; I 875-3; K 768-3 and H 279-1, that 
cotton producing regions in Benin show significant differences in yield and production across 
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these seven varieties. The pan-national pricing system of seed cotton and input cost is also 
inefficient because farmers are spread across different geographical locations and the 
current system implies that some farmers are subsidised by others. The system is therefore 
more egalitarian because it transfers resources from farmers that are more productive to the 
ones that are less productive. Note, however, that the farmers that seem to be less 
productive are more likely to be located in the central region where the majority of gin 
factories are located. As such, it is not clear a priori how the system actually works, and a 
more in-depth study would be need to shed light on the distributional aspect of the current 
system. A distributional analysis of the value added across the different actors in the cotton 
sector would be also needed as we currently lack information for such an analysis. 
With regards to the second question, the answer will depend on the conditions related to the 
world demand for cotton fibres if Benin were to continue to specialise in the export of this 
type of output.55 The data presented in the left panel of Figure 2 suggest that in absolute 
terms the world demand for cotton fibre is continuing to grow. The question that thus arises 
is to what extent Benin is competitive in producing cotton fibre, allowing it to maintain its 
market share in the world market. Benin has a comparative advantage in producing cotton, 
certainly in the Borgou region, where the agro-climatic conditions are the most favourable. A 
number of studies also claim that Benin has a revealed comparative advantage in the 
production of cotton (e.g. World Bank, 2017). Ideally, we would like to compare consistent 
production costs across countries and over time, but we currently lack such data and we 
leave it for further research. Instead, we present in Figure 10 below the market share of 
cotton export in Benin and a number of comparator countries in Africa in the period 1995–
2017. Overall, the market shares of the majority of countries started to decrease from 2015–
2016. If this trend continues then there is reason to worry about this issue. We will 
investigate this point further by including comparators outside Africa. 
Burkina Faso easily outperforms the other countries. Benin displays an average 
performance although its situation improved significantly in the 1990s – but it deteriorated 
dramatically following the introduction of the AIC governance. The situation improved again 









                                               
55 The textile sector is currently less efficient mainly because of electricity costs and excessive imports of second-
hand clothes from Europe and Asia. 
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Figure 10: Export market shares in the global cotton market (% of global export value) 
 
Sources: Observatory of Economic Complexity.  
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Appendix 
 First elected president – Maga: 1 August 1960–24 October 1963. 
 Coup d’état by Colonel Christophe Soglo, chef d’état major: 27 October 1963– January 
1964. 
 New constitution 11 January 1963. 
 Apithy became president after election: January 1964–November 1965 
 Coup d’état – A military government took power: November 1965 
 Apithy set back and Tahirou Congacou, president of the parliament, became 
president and ran a transition to a new government. 
 Tahirou Congacou: 29 November 1965–22 December 1965. 
 Coup d’état – General Christophe Soglo: 22 December 1965–16 December 1967. 
 Development project CFDT, SATEC. 
 Coup d’état by low-ranking officers. 
 Coup d’état – Maurice Kouandété: 17 December 1967–21 December 1967. 
 Coup d’état – Colonel A. Alley: 21 December 1967–1968. 
 New constitution 11 April 1968. 
 New election 15 May 1968, for which the three regional leaders were excluded as 
candidates; in the election only 26% of voters showed up.  
 Among the five candidates Adjou Moumouni obtained 84% of the votes.  
 The results of the election were annulled.  
 Alley formed a new government in May 1968. 
 The military regime appointed Emile Derlin Zinsou as the new president: 31 July 1968–
December 1969: 
 but he accepted only on the condition that a referendum regarding his appointment 
be held. His candidacy was supported by 76.4% of voters, with a 72.6% turnout. 
 Coup d’état by Colonel Kouandoté: December 1969. 
 Election in 1970 but the results were annulled because of an issue of low turnout during 
the election. 
 Conseil Présidentiel was a triumvirate (Apithy-Maga-Ahonmadégbé) system of 
government: 7 May 1970–26 October 1972. 
 Maga: 07 May 1970–May 1972. 
 Ahomadégbé: 07 May 1972–26 October 1972. 
 Coup d’état – Kerekou: 1972–1989. 
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Figure 11: Shares of palm oil and cotton products in export revenue of Benin (%) 
 
Sources: Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
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Discussion of ‘Regulation of a dominant sector: A case 
study of cotton’ 
Along with starchy staple crops, cotton dominates the farming landscape in West Africa. 
Cotton is primarily cultivated under rainfed conditions in rotation with maize, sorghum, and/or 
millet on small family farms that average less than 10 hectares. Being the primary source of 
income for millions of smallholder farmers, cotton can help reduce poverty and improve food 
and nutrition security. As a main source of export revenue, cotton has wide-reaching 
implications for poor developing economies in West Africa.  
The extent that cotton contributes to the socio-economic development of West African 
countries depends heavily on the economic performance of their cotton sectors. In turn, the 
incentive structure embodied in institutions influences the cotton sector’s economic 
performance. Supportive institutions positively affect the ability of individuals and 
organisations to respond to new opportunities and challenges. Well-designed institutions 
create incentives for individuals and organisations to invest, can limit the economic and 
political power of the elites, and provide more equal opportunities for a larger portion of the 
population (Acemoglu, 2003).  
Over the last several decades, major institutional changes have been experimented with in 
West African cotton sectors, with the goal of increasing economic performance. These have 
included changes in social, political, and economic institutions, coming especially from 
market liberalisation and privatisation. With institutional changes come shifts in incentives 
and distributional power. These shifts have affected the economic performance of multiple 
West African cotton sectors, including those of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali. 
West African cotton sectors compete in a highly competitive and global environment. 
Although cotton production and exports are key to their economies, West African countries 
play a relatively small role in the international cotton market compared to larger cotton 
producers and exporters, such as China, India, and the United States. As smaller players on 
the global stage, they need the ability to adapt to external forces (e.g. price fluctuations, 
tariffs, subsidies). In addition, West African cotton sectors face internal constraints that can 
impede economic development, such as missing or imperfect access to inputs, financing, 
and insurance. Well-designed and implemented cotton-based institutions can help mitigate 
both external and internal challenges and support the socio-economic development of their 
countries. 
Many institutional changes have occurred in the West African cotton sectors since achieving 
independence and a common goal has been improving economic performance. These 
changes can be grouped into four general periods: (1) contract with the French parastatal; 
(2) nationalisation of cotton gins; (3) implementation of market-oriented reforms; and (4) 
post-market reforms. Several indicators have been used to assess the economic 
performance of West African cotton sectors. These include production and yield; price; 
access to inputs, credit, and extension services; cotton quality; farm technical efficiency; 
research and development; export revenues; and profitability (Theriault and Tschirley, 2014; 
Theriault and Serra, 2014; Tschirley et al., 2009).     
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John R. Commons’ institutional economic framework is well adapted to understanding the 
evolution in institutions and their related effects on economic performance (Theriault and 
Sterns, 2012). According to Commons’ framework, actions to address limiting factors are the 
drivers of institutional changes. These actions have both intended and unintended 
consequences that affect economic performance, which can lead to the emergence of new 
limiting factors. New sets of limiting factors resume the cycle of institutional change. Each 
institutional change generates a new incentive structure and affects power dynamics within 
the sector. Stakeholders are more likely to resist changes that would decrease their power.   
Contract with the French parastatal (1960 to mid-1970s) – Before the country’s 
independence, the French parastatal, the Compagnie française pour le développement des 
fibres textiles (CFDT) had significant control over the cotton sectors in which it operated, 
managing farm input delivery and the grading and weighing of seed cotton, as well as 
exports. In return for its monopoly status, the French parastatal agreed to purchase all cotton 
production at guaranteed fixed prices announced before the planting season. During this 
period, production went up and the CFDT was profitable. However, much of the profits were 
retained by the French parastatal and little was reinvested in West Africa, and this impeded 
economic development.  
Nationalisation of cotton gins (mid-1970s to mid-1990s) – One of the major institutional 
changes corresponds to the end of the monopoly contract with the CFDT. To encourage 
economic development after independence, several West African governments nationalised 
their cotton sectors, which gave them control over the allocation of cotton export revenue. 
During this nationalisation period, cotton became a primary vehicle for boosting agricultural 
productivity and helped to promote integrated rural development (Theriault and Tschirley, 
2014).  Both cotton and cereal yields benefited from greater public investments. State-owned 
enterprises played an important role in maintaining rural roads, ensuring access to drinkable 
water, and reducing illiteracy. Yet, in the absence of strong institutions, greater power 
created incentives for rent-seeking behaviours and political interference. Farmers were still 
lacking a voice in decisions related to cotton activities. The combination of low farm-gate 
prices, mismanagement, and inefficiencies in ginning operations led to significant debts and 
discontent among farmers. 
Market-oriented reforms (mid-1990s to late 2000s) – In response to poor financial 
performance, donors started to push for market privatisation and liberalisation. The market-
oriented reform process gave farmers the opportunity to better organise themselves to 
increase their voice within the cotton sector. Village-wide, multi-purpose farmer associations 
were transformed into formal groups focused on cotton farmers. More responsibilities, such 
as the management of farm input credit, were transferred to them. Even though farmers, 
through their organisations, became more involved in management activities, their limited 
negotiation power in the determination of the price they received from the gins remained a 
limiting factor (Theriault and Sterns, 2012). 
Market reforms were unevenly and partially implemented (Theriault and Serra, 2014). Benin 
made stronger attempts to privatise and liberalise its cotton sector than Burkina Faso and 
Mali. However, the establishment of several new cotton ginneries in Benin did not lead to 
increased competition, since the vast majority of them fell under the same, private rather 
than public, ownership. Despite the creation of new gins in Burkina Faso, the former state-
owned enterprise continues to be the dominant player. After years of privatisation 
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discussions, the Malian cotton sector remains managed by the state-owned enterprise, 
although it did undergo a change in management. Several factors can explain the uneven 
and partial implementation of the reforms, including resistance to change due to a loss of 
governmental power, as well as scepticism about the need for change and expected 
outcomes. 
Post-market reforms (late 2000s to now) – In the post-market reform era most efforts have 
been channelled towards increasing production. When world prices are high, increased 
production translates into greater export revenues. With greater export revenues, poor 
financial performance is less apparent, and therefore there is less push for market reforms. 
Cotton has been and continues to be produced under contract farming conditions, with 
guaranteed pre-planting pan-territorial prices, guaranteed seed cotton purchase, and input 
credit provision. Both farm-gate and input prices have been key limiting factors to increased 
production. Price incentives, in particular through governmental fertiliser subsidies, have 
been used to encourage farmers to increase cotton production and productivity. But this has 
not always been enough to keep farmers content, as evidenced by the repeated farmer 
boycotts in Burkina Faso recently. After years of decline, Benin cotton production has been 
rising again over the last few years. This increase coincides with the arrival of the new 
president, who has a vested interest in the Beninese cotton sector (Honfoga et al., 2019).  
The current economic performance of West African cotton sectors remains highly affected by 
institutional structure. There is a trade-off between competition and effective coordination 
(Tschirley et al., 2009). Effective coordination tends to facilitate the provision of services and 
improve the quality of cotton. Market competition tends to provide incentives for higher farm-
gate prices and greater cost efficiency at the gin level. In more regulated cotton sectors, 
such as in West Africa, farmers are provided with extension services and inputs on credit but 
receive lower farm-gate prices due to limited competition. The fact that no institutional 
structure performs unambiguously better across all performance dimensions can, in part, 
explain the abandonment of market reforms.    
The institutional structure also affects the ability of cotton to spur food crop productivity. This 
indicator has been the strongest in the regulated cotton sectors of West Africa. Direct and 
indirect pathways, through which state-owned enterprises have contributed to food crop 
intensification, include input provision and extension advice for food crops and agronomic 
spillovers. Moving from a regulated to a more competitive market structure could have 
affected the food–cotton crop interdependence in West Africa, which may have threatened 
food security in the region.  
Other limiting factors to the economic performance of West African cotton sectors include 
climate change, invasive species, low technology adoption, and lack of market influence. 
The increasingly erratic rainfall as a result of climate change has a detrimental impact on 
cotton production and productivity. The proliferation of counterfactual pesticides makes it 
more challenging to control for pests, while posing human, environmental, and financial risks 
to cotton farmers. With limited investment in agricultural research and development, West 
African cotton sectors are facing low and stagnant yields. Low adoption of technologies by 
farmers and gins result in low yields, limited traceability, and quality issues from 
contamination. With low processing capacity and domestic consumption, they are vulnerable 
to global development.  
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Moving forward, it is essential that any proposals to reform the West African cotton sectors 
take into account the institutional setting, such as the strong intertwined relationship between 
food and cotton crops, in order to avoid major discrepancies between expected and realised 
economic performance. Increasing farm productivity, while strengthening farmer resilience 
as well as ginning efficiency are key to improving the economic performance of the West 
African cotton sectors. The promotion of regional integration is a viable approach for West 
African cotton sectors to increase their influence in the international market. Building strong 
institutions take times, but once built, they help to ensure that economic development occurs 
in an effective, accountable, and inclusive way.  
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